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THE LAW'S CONSCIENCE: EQUITABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN 
AMERICA. By ]'eter Charles Hoffer. Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press. 1990. Pp. xiv, 301. Cloth, $32.50; paper, 
$12.95. 
On May 17, 1954, the United States Supreme Court decided Brown 
v. Board of Education, 1 setting in motion the most far-reaching and 
intrusive intervention of the courts into the everyday lives of Ameri-
cans this country has yet witnessed. In the years that followed, Brown 
v. Board of Education II 2 and other important cases in the Supreme 
Court and lower federal courts would spread the gospel of desegrega-
tion throughout North and South via elaborate remedial schemes 
designed to overcome the past effects of inadequate segregated school-
ing on minority students. Erratic in effectiveness and controversial in 
application, these remedies would nonetheless dramatically transform 
the educational landscape for millions of students. Though recent 
events cast doubt on the continuing validity of the broadest of these 
pronouncements, 3 the vital principle remains clear - separate but 
equal educational facilities are "inherently unequal," anathema to our 
constitutional order.4 
Peter Charles Hoffer's5 new book, The Law's Conscience: Equita-
ble Constitutionalism in America, uses Brown as the paradigm of an 
approach to constitutional adjudication that it identifies and traces 
back through American and British history to its roots in equity, law's 
oft-forgotten, sometimes scorned cousin. The meat of the book con-
sists of three parts, each concerned with one of the three pillars on 
which Hoffer's concept of "equitable constitutionalism" rests: trustee-
ship, equality, and reality. A brief epilogue follows, examining the 
Supreme Court's affirmative action jurisprudence in light of the au-
thor's historical analysis. 
The book's overriding observation is that the Warren Court's fre-
quent invocation of "equitable principles" in its decisions refers to 
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
3. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (rejecting minority 
set-aside program designed to remedy prior discrimination absent particularistic evidence of dis-
crimination); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (disallowing minority prefer-
encing in seniority-based teacher layoff scheme). 
4. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. The Supreme Court continues, from time to time, to uphold 
extraordinary judicial actions by lower courts designed to remedy violations of this principle. 
See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990) (upholding court order that local school 
district increase tax rates to fund court-ordered desegregation plan despite state law limiting 
such rates). 
5. Hoffer, a professor of history at the University of Georgia, previously coauthored, with 
N.E.H. Hull, Impeachment ziz America, 1635-1805 (1984). 
1407 
1408 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:1407 
an approach to law, including constitutional law, based on doing justice 
for all concerned. [This approach implies] that ideal equity is fairness, 
giving all their due. Such fairness is expansive and realistic, adjusting 
disputes and redressing hardships so all parties can live with each other; 
it does not end with barren recitals of impersonal rights but addresses 
real harms; it is mutual, multilateral, and reflexive, making the world 
whole again. 6 
Hoffer distinguishes these equitable principles, involving trust relation-
ships, equality, and "a :flexible and humane realism" (p. 8) from the 
more prevalent, formalistic view of equity known to Americans from 
Justice Joseph Story's works7 - a constrained, rule-bound mode of 
adjudication providing extraordinary remedies in carefully defined sit-
uations (p. 12). Beyond this distinction, however, the book asserts 
that the older, broader language of equity, "without its technical trap-
pings [and] institutional authority but with all of its moral force," was 
employed effectively in the British and American political arenas in 
earlier times of crisis (pp. 20-21). This essential unity of the political 
and legal conceptions of equity is at the heart of equitable constitution-
alism, and the book argues that the jurisprudence of equitable consti-
tutionalism follows logically, if not ineluctably, from our history. 
Placing The Law's Conscience in the existing literature is not easy. 
Much of it is pure legal history, in the happiest sense of that term -
historical narrative melded nicely with unobtrusive but trenchant ob-
servation. Yet in a sense it is not legal history at all, for much of what 
the book recounts will be quite familiar even to first-year law students. 
Hoffer uses terms of art like "equity" loosely or in nonlegal ways, and 
accords some complex legal issues only superficial discussion. 8 More-
over, the author relies on a broad range of sources going beyond those 
usually relied on in works of purely legal history. 
If not precisely legal history, Hoffer's work is not purely a work on 
constitutional interpretation, legal/political philosophy, equitable 
remedies, or civil rights either. Centrally concerned with issues of 
constitutional interpretation, it relies little on the extraordinarily rich 
literature on hermeneutics in the law and elsewhere. Discussing works 
of political and legal philosophy, it nonetheless descends frequently 
and willingly from that highly conceptual level to the more mundane 
mechanics of equity jurisprudence. And though the author is obvi-
ously concerned with civil rights issues, the book hovers about the 
6. P. 7. Identifying the methodology of equitable constitutionalism with the Warren Court is 
not to say that other courts at other times have not approached cases in this way, but only that 
the Warren Court is paradigmatic. Indeed, Hoffer's book seeks to demonstrate that the approach 
is both normatively sound and historically supported by prior equity practice and theory. 
7. Principally J. STORY, CoMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (1836). 
8. The most important of these oversimplifications concerns the raging debate on issues of 
constitutional interpretation born in the crucible of cases like Brown. 
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topic in prologue and epilogue and chapters interspersed throughout 
the text, without settling decisively there either. 
The book is best described as a more general work - a broadly 
conceived, meticulously researched, and sometimes boldly written ef-
fort to extract from a series of events the important currents of 
thought and motivation propelling them. Not uniformly successful, it 
nonetheless provides insightful, original, and informative reading ac-
cessible to students of either history or law. 
The three core parts of the work explore the concepts of trustee-
ship {pp. 23-79), equality {pp. 81-137), and reality {pp. 139-98), which 
are central to equitable constitutionalism. 9 Each part seeks to link, 
through exploration of Anglo-American political crises, the legal con-
ception of equity to the political one, a linkage moving toward a unity 
which Hoffer finds culminated in Brown and its progeny {p. 198). 
The book examines the trusteeship ideal in the context of two 
chapters, one concerned with English history of the Protectorate and 
Restoration and the other with American colonial history. These 
chapters trace the evolution of equity in the early courts of England, 
and the evolution of political theory in England and America based on 
the language of equity and, more specifically, equitable trusts. 
Hoffer makes a number of interesting observations in this founda-
tional segment. Focusing on John Locke, not as an exponent of con-
tractarian ideals, but for his analogical utilization of the language of 
trusts {pp. 42-44), the book finds in his works the seed of ideas that 
would bloom a century later on a distant continent {pp. 45-46). 
Thomas Jefferson, an equity lawyer, would take these Lockean foun-
dations and build on them, relying frequently on the language of trusts 
for revolutionary political argument {pp. 66-67). The Declaration of 
Independence, which the book compares, segment by segment, to a 
"bill" (or complaint) in equity, provides a celebrated example of this 
phenomenon {pp. 71-77). 
The trusteeship language of equity avoided certain difficulties for 
the revolutionaries inherent in contractarian arguments against the 
Crown. Arguments based on social compact could not justify the 
drastic remedy the revolutionaries required. But by casting the King 
as trustee for the colonists, 10 dissolution of the "trust" and replace-
ment of the trustee could be justified {pp. 70-71). 
The trust analogy posed problems for the revolutionaries, however, 
because of the historical view that equity, "the conscience of the 
9. The reader must not attach legal connotations to .the meaning of these words at the outset 
because Hoffer does not use these words as legal terms of art. This is particularly important with 
respect to the terms "reality" and "realism," which Hoffer uses not simply to describe a formal-
ist/realist dichotomy, but more casually to indicate a jurisprudence that recognizes empirical 
reality and is not confined to artificial legalisms and doctrine. Pp. 139-98. 
10. In this model, the colonists would be beneficiaries and equitable titleholders of the 
colonies. 
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Crown," was founded (naturally) on the Crown's sovereignty. This 
made the Second Continental Congress a dubious court to pronounce 
such a terminal remedy, since it did not derive any authority from the 
King. By ahistorically reconstituting equity in the language of popular 
sovereignty and appointing the Continental Congress its spokesperson, 
Jefferson avoided this difficulty (p. 73). The King, having breached his 
fiduciary duty, could be removed as trustee and the trust dissolved. 
Part II of the book concerns the equality norm central to equitable 
constitutionalism. In the first of two chapters, the slowest chapter of 
the book, Hoffer traces the early evolution of equity in the state and 
federal courts of the new republic before moving on, in the second 
chapter, to consider the role of equality concerns in Reconstruction. 
Early authorities on equity, such as Joseph Story, worried that un-
constrained chancellors would abuse their broad discretion, reaching 
out beyond the controversy before them to reorder social and eco-
nomic relations in the society at large. This concern was particularly 
acute with respect to the slavery issue. Personally opposed to slavery, 
Story was nevertheless more concerned with maintenance of the 
Union. He saw in the "troubled conscience" of the chancellor the po-
tential for its disintegration (p. 82). The ideas of Story and other like-
minded authorities would ultimately succeed in chaining the chancel-
lor's discretion by formalizing much of equity practice through unified 
procedural codes and other doctrinal devices (pp. 100-06). 
As the nation neared civil war, cases involving testamentary manu-
mission of slaves would pit the consciences of chancellors against a 
Southern legal regime steadfast in its barriers against such actions (pp. 
111-23). In almost every case, conscience lost (pp. 116-17). But in 
those few cases where it did not, and where manumission was allowed, 
Hoffer sees a preference for equality before the law that would have a 
profound effect on Reconstruction and its legacy (p. 123). 
The book characterizes the entirety of Reconstruction as an "equi-
table public trust" (p. 134). The Reconstruction amendments, the 
Civil Rights Acts, and the Freedmen's Bureau embodied two of the 
key ingredients of equitable constitutionalism, trusteeship (the Bu-
reau) and legal equality (the amendments and acts) (pp. 126-34). Un-
fortunately, however, The Civil Rights Cases 11 thwarted the full 
realization of the principle by refusing to recognize the final element, 
realism (p. 135). The Court argued that blacks had secured equal 
rights under the law and must now prosper without governmental fa-
voritism, ignoring the systematic, governmentally fostered reality 
which guaranteed blacks "inferior legal status, earning power, and 
political influence" (p. 135). Equality at law and public trust concep-
11. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
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tions were rendered useless while "real judges in real courts were [not] 
willing to enforce [them],, (p. 137). 
The last part of The Law's Conscience is its most complex and 
problematic. In Part III Hoffer explores the necessity of realism to 
equitable constitutionalism. Although the book finds the Supreme 
Court's post-Civil War jurisprudence formalistic and singularly lack-
ing in willingness to confront reality (pp. 139-42), it argues that for-
malism ultimately became a trap for the Court, finally giving way to a 
more flexible approach which ultimately produced Brown - the para-
digm of equitable constitutionalism (pp. 143-46). 
The salvation of equity from the damnation of formalism came in 
the form of a doctrine known as Balance of Equity. Developed in re-
sponse to the need for tolerance of the inevitable inconveniences 
caused by industry following the Civil War, the doctrine provided a 
basis for judges to deny injunctive relief against manufacturers in nui-
sance cases. In such cases the benefit to the plaintiff from an injunc-
tion was balanced, rather precariously in most instances, against the 
harm to the defendant manufacturer from the injunction. If the bene-
fit did not outweigh the harm, no relief would be granted (pp. 151-52). 
Balancing the nuisance injunction's impact on the plaintiff and its 
impact on the enterprise affected inevitably involved real world con-
siderations, and this sense of reality seeped into the opinions in this 
area (p. 154). The judicial handling of injunctions in other areas, like 
government regulation and labor, however, remained remorselessly 
formalistic (p. 156). A generation later, this would begin to change 
dramatically (pp. 157-58). Balance of Equity evolved under pressure 
from the new social science and emergent political forces into a power-
ful tool for managing societal problems by looking deeply into their 
factual basis, including their impact on the parties and the public, and 
fashioning responsive remedies based on real world considerations (pp. 
171-74). 
This approach would lead, twenty odd years later, to the Supreme 
Court's decisions in Brown 12 and Brown 1113 (pp. 180-81). The author 
views these decisions as flawed but proud attempts to reach injustice in 
a way that would realistically promote fairness for all concerned (pp. 
181-90). Initially limited in impact, these attempts would meet with 
considerable but delayed success two decades later in the courageous 
remedial decisions handed down by federal district courts.14 
The book's treatment of Brown, Brown II, and their lower court 
12. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
13. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
14. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I (1971) (affirming 
district court decision ordering busing to desegregate the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system 
in North Carolina); see also J. BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981); SOUTHERN JUSTICE (L. Fried-
man ed. 1965); J. PELTASON, FlFIY-EIGHT LoNELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND 
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1961). 
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progeny is complex and strives for "fairmindedness,"15 lauding the ap-
proach taken while acknowledging the inadequacies inherent in the 
opinions, the most notable of which is Brown ll's equivocal "all delib-
erate speed"16 formulation (pp. 186-87). This formulation of the time 
frame for remedial action pursuant to Brown virtually eliminated any 
chance for prompt compliance with the desegregation decree (pp. 186-
87). The book nevertheless defends Brown II, denying that it repre-
sents a compromise to secure unanimity or a concession to federalism 
and insisting that it represents instead a "highly ambitious" fusion of 
"higher equity" and real world remedy stressing fairness and flexibility 
(p. 189). 
This defense is somewhat quickly made and not altogether con-
vincing. Certainly arguments can be made in support of the general 
approach taken in Brown JI, including those which the author sets out. 
These arguments do not, however, demonstrate that Brown II was not 
also a compromise designed to ensure unanimity or a concession to 
federalism. 
More importantly, the book recognizes but gives short shrift to im-
portant arguments against balancing approaches to cases involving 
constitutional rights.17 These approaches pose serious potential dan-
gers. Provision of "realistic" remedies may in practice and perception 
generate weaker protections than full remedies that are less likely to 
succeed, 18 and remedial balancing may obscure the substantive right 
on which it has been fashioned by considering it just another factor in 
the equation, directly comparable with other interests.19 
Beyond incidentally submerging spirited substantive debate be-
neath pseudo-mathematical equations, though, balancing approaches 
risk permitting intentional cloaking of substantive choices. Indeed, 
one of the most powerful critiques of balancing centers on the inevita-
ble unavailability of objective valuation techniques for the interests in-
volved. 20 It thus becomes easy to cast around for some likely variables 
and quantify them in a way that produces the desired outcome. Such 
a process need not even be conscious. 
15. Hoffer asserts in a brief prefatory cavil against law office history that "the historian must 
not let commitment to a particular policy or its reform dictate a reading of past documents that 
distorts their sense or ignores their context." P. xi. 
16. 349 U.S. at 301. 
17. Pp. 186-87, 285 n.22. See Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in an Age of Balancing, 96 
YALE L.J. 943 (1987), for an extended argument against this approach. Note, however, that 
neither Brown nor Brown II is generally viewed as a balancing case. Still, the decisional method-
ology the book supports, stressing accommodation of reality and effective remedies, is susceptible 
to an analogous balancing critique. 
18. But see Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983) (arguing that realis-
tic interest balancing remedies are preferable to rights maximizing ones but arguing for judicial 
candor in their application). 
19. See Aleinikoff, supra note 17, at 986-87. 
20. See id. at 973-74. 
May 1991] Constitutional Law and Theory 1413 
Clearly there is a difference between ignoring reality and denying 
principle. Both are jurisprudential evils and are perhaps, though this 
is not beyond question, independently rectifiable. Balancing ap-
proaches may endanger this possibility. Equitable constitutionalism 
eschews formalist approaches that ignore situational reality, but in de-
claiming the virtues of discretion and balancing the book runs the risk 
of arguing for a methodology obscuring principle. 
* * * 
The book presents remarkably disparate yet subtly connected ideas 
in a coherent, interesting way. With the exception of a few difficult 
pages summarizing the evolution of particularly intricate doctrinal 
points, Hoffer writes in an engaging, vigorous style which sustains in-
terest throughout. Complex legal issues, where examined, are de-
scribed with unusual clarity and thus rendered accessible even to the 
layperson. Hoffer's summary of positions taken by the various Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court in the complex affirmative action jurispru-
dence of recent years is an excellent example (pp. 200-11). 
The author weaves great variety into his text. Beyond the usual 
cases, legal treatises, and law review articles, the book refers fre-
quently to nonlegal texts, correspondence, and papers regarding a 
broad range of human endeavor. Though its generality sometimes 
compels explanations unnecessary to the knowledgeable legal reader, 
the breadth of the book's approach is more than ample restitution for 
this small inconvenience. 
The legal community will find in Hoffer's book a fresh way of con-
ceptualizing old events and ideas. Refusing to be bound to the conven-
tional terms of the interpretational debate, the book puts forth a novel 
vision of what is going on in civil rights cases and other cases involving 
complex remedial decrees, ambiguous motivations, and a real world at 
odds with the doctrinal one. If the book's mission is sometimes un-
clear, and its argument for "equitable" approaches to constitutional 
questions not thoroughly convincing, it nevertheless remains consist-
ently readable and informative throughout. 
- Neil A. Riemann 
